Author: Ashley Miller
Frameworks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 | NIST RMF | FISMA | FedRAMP | 32 CFR Part 2002 | DoDI 8510.01
Platform: AWS GovCloud
Classification: Unclassified — Portfolio Demonstration Project
Status: Active — Artifacts In Development
Operation Iron Shield (OIS) is a fictional DoD program supporting a web-based case management system that processes and stores Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI). The system is hosted on AWS GovCloud and accessed by 47 government users across three locations — Washington D.C., San Antonio TX, and a remote workforce.
This project demonstrates the full NIST Risk Management Framework (RMF) authorization lifecycle for a DoD information system — from initial system categorization through control implementation documentation. All artifacts follow federal authorization package standards and reflect real-world ISSO documentation practices.
You have been assigned as the ISSO for OIS-CMS. The system has been operational for two years supporting 47 DoD users across three locations processing CUI case records on AWS GovCloud. The system has never undergone a formal RMF authorization. Your mission is to build the authorization package and get the system to an ATO.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| System Name | Operation Iron Shield Case Management System |
| System Abbreviation | OIS-CMS |
| Unique Identifier | OIS-CMS-001 |
| System Type | Major Application |
| Operating Environment | AWS GovCloud (FedRAMP High) |
| Data Classification | Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) |
| Impact Level | MODERATE — per FIPS 199 |
| Control Baseline | NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 Moderate |
| User Population | 47 DoD Government Users |
| Locations | Washington D.C. | San Antonio TX | Remote Workforce |
| System Status | Operational — Authorization Pending |
| Component | AWS Service | Security Function |
|---|---|---|
| Web Application | AWS Elastic Beanstalk | Hosts the internet-facing case management application |
| Database | Amazon RDS | Stores CUI case records encrypted at rest |
| Encryption | AWS Key Management Service (KMS) | Manages encryption keys for data at rest and in transit |
| Audit Logging | AWS CloudTrail | Immutable audit record of all API calls and system activity |
| Monitoring & Alerting | AWS CloudWatch | Real-time system health monitoring and threshold alerting |
| Network Security | AWS VPC | Security Groups | WAF | Network boundary protection and malicious traffic filtering |
| Identity & Access | AWS IAM | Infrastructure-level identity and access management |
| Security Objective | Rating | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality | MODERATE | Unauthorized disclosure of CUI could harm individuals, damage agency operations, or compromise national security activities |
| Integrity | MODERATE | Unauthorized modification of case records could result in incorrect decisions being made on corrupted government data |
| Availability | MODERATE | 47 DoD users across three locations depend on the system for mission-critical functions — extended outage disrupts operations |
| Overall Categorization | MODERATE | High water mark across all three objectives per FIPS 199 methodology |
| Framework | Applicability |
|---|---|
| FISMA | Foundational federal law requiring information security programs for all federal systems |
| NIST SP 800-37 Rev 2 | Defines the six-step RMF process governing this authorization package |
| FIPS 199 | Establishes the security categorization methodology — system categorized as Moderate |
| FIPS 200 | Establishes minimum security requirements for Moderate impact systems |
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 | Provides the Moderate control baseline implemented by OIS-CMS |
| FedRAMP | Governs cloud service authorization — OIS-CMS hosted on AWS GovCloud FedRAMP High |
| 32 CFR Part 2002 | Establishes CUI handling, safeguarding, and dissemination requirements |
| DoDI 8510.01 | Implements RMF for DoD IT including eMASS authorization package requirements |
Eight-section federal SSP documenting the complete security posture of OIS-CMS including system identification, FIPS 199 categorization, system architecture, AWS inherited controls, system interconnection policy, compliance framework stack, and five control implementation statements.
Controls Documented: AC-2 | IA-2 | AU-2 | SC-8 | IR-4
File: OIS_CMS_SSP_v1.docx
Spreadsheet mapping all applicable NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 Moderate baseline controls to their implementation status, control type (inherited/hybrid/system-specific), responsible owner, and evidence artifacts.
File: OIS_CMS_SCTM_v1.xlsx
RMF Step 5 compliant POA&M tracking all identified control weaknesses with risk ratings, remediation owners, milestone steps, and projected completion dates.
File: OIS_CMS_POAM_v1.xlsx
Formal memorandum summarizing the security posture of OIS-CMS and providing an authorization recommendation to the Authorizing Official.
File: OIS_CMS_ATO_Memo_v1.docx
| Control | Family | Type | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| AC-2 | Access Control — Account Management | Hybrid | ✅ Documented |
| IA-2 | Identification & Authentication | Hybrid | ✅ Documented |
| AU-2 | Audit & Accountability — Event Logging | Hybrid | ✅ Documented |
| SC-8 | System & Communications — Transmission Protection | Hybrid | ✅ Documented |
| IR-4 | Incident Response — Incident Handling | System-Specific | ✅ Documented |
Why Moderate and not High: OIS-CMS processes CUI but the potential impact of a confidentiality, integrity, or availability failure — while significant — does not rise to the level of loss of life, major financial damage, or catastrophic national security harm required for a High categorization under FIPS 199.
Why AWS GovCloud: AWS GovCloud holds a FedRAMP High authorization providing OIS-CMS with a strong inherited control foundation for physical security, infrastructure protection, and core cloud service security — significantly reducing the system-specific control burden while meeting DoD cloud hosting requirements.
Why no interconnections at launch: OIS-CMS launched with a self-contained boundary to minimize initial attack surface and risk exposure. A pending Active Directory interconnection will be governed by a fully executed ISA and MOU with verification of the connecting system’s active ATO and current security assessment results before implementation.
AWS GovCloud | AWS IAM | AWS CloudTrail | AWS CloudWatch | AWS KMS | AWS WAF | AWS VPC | NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 | NIST RMF | FISMA | FedRAMP | 32 CFR Part 2002 | DoDI 8510.01
Part of the Ashley Miller GRC & Cybersecurity Portfolio
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